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in
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of
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Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby,
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original)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant respectfully objects to the factual assertions
made in Respondent's Petition on the basis that essentially
all

relevant

facts set

forth

therein are either

totally

misstated or are taken out of context and do not accurately
reflect the facts of the case.
At the time of the trial, the parties had been married
nearly 17 years.

At the time of the marriage both parties

were high school graduates, and Respondent was employed by
the Army but did not remember his salary at the time of the
trial.

(Transcript, page 4, lines 23-24, hereinafter T4, 23-

24).

During the marriage Defendant obtained a bachelor1s

degree from Weber State College, a medical degree from the
University
internship

of
at

Utah

School

the Gysinger

of

Medicine,

Medical

Center

completed

an

in Danville,

Pennsylvania, and had completed a residency as an emergency
room physician at the same institution.

He was employed in

the first year of a two year contract which provided a salary
of $100,000.00 per year.

(T8, 25).

From this $100,000.00

per year, the Defendant testified that he had approximately
$7,100.00 in practice-related expenditures, leaving him with
a gross personal income of $92,900.00 per year or $7,741.67
per month.
that

(T10-12 and T66, 24).

Defendant

having

yet

specialist.

was

become

able
board

It should also be noted

to command
certified

(T8, 17-20).

At

2

this salary

without

as an emergency

room

the time that the parties

separated

and

Plaintiff

returned

to the

State

of Utah,

Defendant had completed all but six month's of his residency,
and had admitted

to Plaintiff

that he had been having an

extra-marital affair which he was not willing to discontinue.
(T20,

2-17).

He

had

further

earlier

expressed

an

unwillingness to take part in marriage counseling to attempt
to solve the parties' marital difficulties.

(T20, 18-22).

Under

the

these

circumstances,

Plaintiff

and

children

returned to the State of Utah where she filed this action for
divorce.
During the marriage Plaintiff had quit her job in Utah
to accompany Defendant to Germany where the parties eked out
an existence on the income of a junior enlisted person and
started

their family.

(T4, 18-22 and T29, 19-13).

In his

Petition, Respondent claims that a portion of the schooling
and

living

expenses

experienced

by the party during the

marriage were paid for by "his" veteran's benefits.
any

"earning"

of

this

benefit

was

However,

participated

in by

Plaintiff who experienced the financial hardships associated
with living in Europe on a junior enlisted person's pay right
along with Defendant.
After Defendant's discharge from the Army, he obtained
employment

at

Hill

Air

Force

Base

as

an

electronics

technician at an income which he recalled to be approximately
$9,000.00

per

year.

(T5,

18-12).

This

figure

is

substantially below the income figure shown as an average for

3

a high school graduate and utilized by Plaintiff's experts at
the time of trial, that sum being $33,600.00 per year.

(T83,

4) .
Plaintiff concedes that Defendant continued to work and
support the family during the period of time that he obtained
the college education.

However, during this time he devoted

considerable time and effort to the pursuit of the education,
and Plaintiff was required to bear a larger portion of the
family
(T30,

responsibilities

than would normally be the case,

1-5 and 10-14) in addition to which she was employed

outside of the home to the maximum extent feasible under the
circumstances then existing.

(T34, 13-23 and T7, 16-17).

At

trial she pointed out that her employment possibilities were
limited

by child

care expenses, and that her

outside

the home was therefore essentially restricted to

times when Defendant
children.

would

(T35, 1-10).

be at home

employment

to care

for

the

Under these circumstances it was

evident at trial that her employment outside the home for six
years represented a sacrifice by the entire family, but this
was one of the sacrifices paid as part of the investment
decision

based

upon

the

expectation

of

substantially

increased future income and benefits which would be available
to

the entire

family.
the

(T33, 15-20 and

sacrifices

made

is

T34, 1 9 ) .
clearly

The

magnitude

of

evident

throughout

the record before the Court, and included the

parties living in a home which was not much more than a shack

4

in a sparsely populated

rural area of Pennsylvania with no

telephone, no close neighbors, and income which did not even
provide adequate

funds

for the parties 1

(T36, 1-4

children to buy

school

lunch.

and T37, 18-19).

In addition,

during

this time, the testimony was clear that Defendant

refused to allow Plaintiff to work in any fast food or other
types of restaurants where she might otherwise be able to
find a job with her limited employment skills.

(T37, 1-4).

In Defendant's Exhibit A he claims that Plaintiff worked for
only three years during the marriage, when in fact his own
Petition
worked

for Writ

during

of Certiorari

from the Defendant's exhibit.

for Writ of Certiorari page 7 ) .
that

that she also

1978, 1979 and 1980 as a waitress but these

years are omitted

reflects

he admits

she worked

before being precluded

(Petition

An analysis of his dates

at

least six and one-half years

from

further work by the move to

Pennsylvania where Plaintiff could not find work despite a
diligent search.
During

the

(T36, 6-25 and T37, 1-4).
marriage,

Plaintiff

admitted

to

being

extremely concerned about the marriage being able to survive
additional

stress and sacrifices required

complete medical school.

for Defendant to

(T31, 1-8 and 13-21).

However, she

also testified that she had been repeatedly assured that if
she and the children would support this investment concept,
her sacrifices would be more than made up to them by the
significantly increased income and standard of living, and in

5

his flexible time as a physician which would enable him to
see the children more.

(T33, 17-21).

The fact that she was

reluctant to make sacrifices of that magnitude on an ongoing
basis only highlights the extent of her "contribution1' to the
investment matrix pursuit by the family entity.

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS 1 DECISION CREATING THE
REMEDY OF EQUITABLE RESTITUTION IS THE COURT! S
ANSWER TO A PROBLEM ADDRESSED IN PREVIOUS CASES
FOR WHICH A REMEDY WAS NECESSARY.
In Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P. 2d 237 at 242 (Utah App.
1987),

the Utah Court of Appeals addresses the problem of

reimbursing

a spouse who has sacrificed

to help the other

spouse attain education but is divorced before the fruits of
that

education are realized.

In footnote 4, the Peterson

Court says that "rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" alimony,
not

terminable upon remarriage, may be the creative remedy

necessary to achieve fairness in such cases.

The Court cites

Wisconsin and New Jersey decisions as examples.

Haugan v.

Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2nd 796 (1984) and Mahoney v.
Mahoney,

91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d

527

(1982).

The Court's

creation of the equitable restitution remedy is merely a form
of reimbursement or rehabilitative alimony to compensate the
sacrificing spouse when a division of assets would be wholly
inadequate.

In the case at bar, the parties1 main asset was

a house valued at $63,000.00, hardly sufficient to compensate

6

Mrs. Martinez

for having sacrificed and supported the

Defendant during 17 years of marriage while the Defendant
earned both his bachelors and M.D. degrees.

In Peterson, the

Utah Court of Appeals awarded Mrs. Peterson $1,000.00 per
month

alimony

and

characterized

the Trial

Court's

$120,000.00 cash settlement representing Mrs. Peterson's
interest

in her husband's medical degree as additional

alimony making a total alimony award of $2,000.00 per month.
In Martinez, the Court of Appeals awarded Mrs. Martinez
permanent alimony in the amount of $750.00 per month and
created the remedy of equitable restitution to repay Mrs.
Martinez for her sacrifice, similar to the $120,000.00 cash
settlement awarded in Peterson.
In Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987),
the Court

affirmed

the Peterson decision holding that

although an advanced degree is not property, the disparity in
earning potential

is a factor in the alimony analysis.

However, in Rayburn, the parties were not married until Dr.
Rayburn had already obtained his M.D. degree and there were
substantial assets to be divided.

In addition, Mrs. Rayburn

already had a masters degree and the Court presumes she was
capable of earning substantial income particularly after the
rehabilitative alimony awarded allowed her to obtain further
education.

The Rayburn Court reiterates the Peterson

decision that in cases such as the Martinez case where the
parties are divorced before there are sufficient assets to

7

compensate the supporting spouse, "an award of non-terminable
rehabilitative
appropriate."

or

reimbursement

alimony

would

be

Icl. at 241.

The Utah Supreme Court also recognizes the need for some
type

of

rehabilitative

supporting spouse.

or reimbursement

payment

to

the

In Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P. 2d 1076 at

1081 (Utah 1988), the Court points out that the Gardner case
involved a long term marriage where the fruits of the M.D.
degree were available to be divided.
that

in cases where

compensate
required

there are not sufficient

the supporting

another

Court of Appeals1

The Court recognizes

spouse,

solution."

"equity

and

assets to
fairness

Equitable restitution is the

"other" solution to the problem addressed

in Peterson, Rayburn, and Gardner.
Defendant and his counsel were fully advised early in
the proceeding that Plaintiff was claiming an interest in the
medical degree as a part of the marital assets accumulated
during the marriage.
paragraph

9,

(Stipulation And Settlement Agreement

February,

1983).

Defendant

had

adequate

opportunity to present expert testimony at the trial of the
case

to establish

the value of that medical degree or to

challenge Plaintifffs valuation thereof, but elected not to
do so at the trial.
certified
from

Utah

Two experts retained by Plaintiff, a

financial advisor and the professor of economics
State

University

valued

the

flow of

income

attributable to the medical degree in excess of that which

8

would
the

be

earned

United

high

States

by

17;

was

gross

and

business
(T66,

and T71 ,

year
the

and

in

within

reasonable
experts.

such

the

placed

the

by

the

being

caused

by

of

experts

were

in

the

two

estimated

of

21-25;

concept

cost

discovery
cost

$7,100.00
and

of

T84,

of
per

1-4).

"human

capital"

was a r e a d i l y

accepted

the

of

in

respective

on t h e a c t u a l

economics

upon

the

the

Martinez

human c a p i t a l

of

pre-trial

T83,

that

by a d i f f e r e n c e

the

upon

the

of

respectively.

The d i f f e r e n c e

that

average

excess

10).

7(9);

7 - 9 and T 7 9 .

in

dollars

utilized

based

as

within

commencement

being based

field

valuation
(T64,

the

t o by D r .

T67,

graduate

year

far

million

based

testified

per

utilized

other

21-24;

school

sum

to

figures

Both w i t n e s s e s

concept

as

testified

investment

a

1.7

having

per

indications,

and

explained

one

$10,000.00

year.

income,

The v a l u e s

income

witnesses,

doing

18;

high

$33,600.00

prior

dollars

T83,

valuations
the

using

process.

million

(T82,

average

Defendant

educational
1.8

the

graduate ! s

school

earned

by

and

data

one

subject

available

to

to
the

5-10).

POINT

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT UNDER
FEDERAL LAW THE CUSTODIAL PARENT I S ENTITLED TO
TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR THE CHILDREN UNLESS THERE I S A
P R E - 1 9 8 5 INSTRUMENT ORDERING OTHERWISE.
The
federal

Court
law,

of
the

Appeals

correctly

custodial

9

parent

decided
is

that

entitled

under
to

tax

exemptions for the children unless there is a pre-1985
instrument ordering otherwise.

As Appellant argued on

appeal, Section 152 of 26 U.S.C. outlines the federal law for
income tax exemptions.

The

Supremacy clause of the U.S.

Constitution, Article IV, Clause 2, says that the laws of the
United States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.

The

Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
Congress has the power to collect taxes on income.

Thus,

federal law would preempt any state law to the contrary.
The Petitioner cites Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276
(Utah 1987) for the proposition that the Trial Court can
distribute tax exemptions equitably.

The case in fact stands

for the proposition that issues can be adjudicated although
not plead.

The Utah Supreme Court says in Newmeyer that the

Trial Court can adjudicate "such issues" as tax exemptions
even when the issues are not raised in the pleadings under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, 15(b).

Id. at 1279.

The Court

says nothing about the tax exemption issue per se.

The Court

no gives indication that it even considered or was aware of
the 1984 Tax Reform Act and its affect on 26 U.S.C. Section
152(e).

Mrs. Newmeyer's prayer for relief gave the tax

exemption to Mr. Newmeyer, the non-custodial parent.

The

Trial Court awarded the exemption to Mrs. Newmeyer after
adjudication and Mr. Newmeyer argues on appeal that the issue
was not plead and therefore should not have been heard.

The

Utah Court upholds the Trial Court but does not refer to

10

federal law at all and the case can hardly be considered a
definitive holding on the tax exemption issue.
In Martinez, the Utah Court of Appeals, having decided
that there was no longer a pre-1985 instrument to qualify as
an exception to the rule in U.S.C. Section 152(e), correctly
decides

that

exemptions

the custodial

parent

is entitled

to the tax

for the children under federal law.

The Utah

statute relied upon by the Petitioner is silent as to the tax
exemption

issue.

U.C.A.

Section

30-3-5

(1987) would be

preempted by federal law even if it were specific on the tax
exemption issue.

POINT III

THE COURT OF APPEALS' MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY AND
CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS WAS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
The record in this case includes a 137 page transcript
and

10 exhibits.

Mrs. Martinez1

The transcript

income

includes testimony as to

(T42, 6-25) and her monthly expenses

including a list of many needed home repairs and appliances
that

needed

Plaintiff's
Martinez 1

to be replaced
Exhibit

F).

or repaired

(T41, 9-13

There was testimony

and

as to Dr.

gross and net earnings. (T8, 25 and T103, 4-8).

The value of the parties1

only major asset, the home, was

stipulated to as was the equity and was outlined in exhibits.
(T24, 17-19 and Plaintiff's Exhibits B, C, D and E ) .

11

Petitioner complains that the Utah Court of Appeals set
alimony based on Dr. Martinez1
speculative.

future income which was

At the time of trial, Dr. Martinez was not yet

board certified but was earning $100,000.00 per year on a two
year

contract.

While there was no evidence of future

employment or potential income in the record, an assumption
that he could earn as much after becoming board certified as
he had before is certainly not too speculative.
The Trial Court's award was a clear abuse of discretion
and amounted to manifest injustice and inequity.

The Utah

Court of Appeals substituted its own judgment for that of the
Trial Court based on substantial evidence in the record
following the standard for review outlined in Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 at 1076 (Utah 1988) citing Turner v.
Turner , 649 P.2d

6 at 8 (Utah 1982), and Peterson v.

Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 at 239 (Utah App. 1987) also citing
Turner.

In addition, the Martinez decision analyzes its

child support award and award of alimony by Utah common law
criteria.
At

the

trial, Plaintiff

presented

all

evidence

reasonably necessary to the establishment of a child support
and alimony award, in addition to any value necessary for the
decree itself.

Defendant had adequate opportunity to present

whatever evidence he felt appropriate to the same subject.
Any shortcoming in the record, is as a result of Defendant's
failure to adequately present the case to the trial court,

12

and

certainly

evidentiary

does

hearing

not

justify

a remand

for

in order to allow Defendant

further
to better

prepare for a second trial than he and his counsel did for
the first.

The fact that Plaintiff's establishment of "need"

had been based upon her and the children living within the
limited means available to them up to and prior to the trial
was correctly perceived by the Court of Appeals as a problem
characteristic
11

threshold

of

cases

such

as

these

characterized

as

cases" wherein the fruits of the investment are

never received by the supporting spouse prior to the divorce
initiation after an extended period of "investments".

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals1

decision creating the remedy of

equitable

restitution

is the Court's answer to a problem

addressed

in previous

cases

necessary.

for which a new remedy

was

The equitable restitution may be a refinement of

the rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony concept, a remedy
described by the Utah Court of Appeals in both the Peterson
and Rayburn

cases.

The need

for such a remedy

is also

outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in the Gardner case.
The
federal

Court
law,

of Appeals
the

correctly

custodial

exemptions

for

the

instrument

ordering

children

parent
unless

otherwise.
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decided

that

is entitled
there

under
to

tax

is a pre-1985

As Appellant

argued

on

appeal, Section 152 of 26 U.S.C. outlines the federal law for
income

tax exemptions.

The Supremacy clause of the U.S.

Constitution, Article IV, Clause 2, says that the laws of the
United

States shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.

The

Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
Congress has the power to collect taxes on income.

Thus,

federal law would preempt any state law to the contrary.
The Court of Appeals' modification of alimony and child
support

awards was based

on substantial

evidence in the

record and was well within the Court's power.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

1 [jr* day of June, 1988.

f.
L

NEIL B. CRIST

j

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
day of June,
1988, I hand delivered to each of the two attorneys below two
true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellate!s Brief in
Opposition to Respondent's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
the Supreme Court of Utah and to:
Paul H. Liapis
Gustin, Green, Stegall & Liapis
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Kent M. Kasting
Dart, Adamson & Kasting
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

nfllU^fl &J>.ftO

14

APPENDIX
All

cases cited

are

included

in the Appendix of the

Petition the Supreme Court of Utah for Writ of Certiorari, as
is 26 U.S.C. Section 152.
Constitution

and

the

Article IV, Clause 2 of the U.S.

Sixteenth

Amendment

Constitution are included in the text herein.
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